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COMBATING THE FINANCING OF TERRORISM:
THE ROLES OF THE IMF
JoY SMALLWOOD*
ESPONSES to the rise in international crime touch on many of the
J ompelling legal problems we face today as policymakers, both na-
tionally and internationally. One of the biggest challenges in combating
international crime we face is the very nature of its global reach. Crimes
can be committed in one country, the proceeds sent to another and the
perpetrators disappear to yet another country. In the 1980s, with the war
on drugs, delinking the proceeds of crime from the crime itself was seen
as a way to combat drug trafficking. In 1989, at the G-7 Summit in Paris,
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was formed for the purpose of
"the development and promotion of policies, both at national and interna-
tional levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. " ' The
FATF is a policy making body comprised of officials from twenty-eight
countries who meet three times a year. They set the standards for anti-
money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT),
and evaluate each other's progress in this area by conducting on-site visits
to member countries.
The FATF has extended the concept of delinking proceeds of crime
from the crime itself to other crimes. Today, the FATF has agreed to a
minimum list of crimes that all countries globally should make "predicate
crimes" for money laundering so that the proceeds of such crimes can be
seized, restrained, forfeited and confiscated. In 2003, the FATF issued a
revised standard encapsulated in the FATF Forty Recommendations. The
Eight Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing remain in effect
from 2001, and a ninth was recently added. In 2004, the FATF, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank worked together to
draft the Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF Forty Rec-
ommendations and the FATF Eight Special Recommendations ("2004
Methodology"), which lists a number of criteria under each recommenda-
tion which must be met.2 Therefore, I would like to focus on the legal and
institutional requirements for compliance with the FATF requirements on
* Attorney, International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. The views
expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the
views of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or IMF policy.
1. Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), More About the
FATF and Its Works: What Is the FATF, [hereinafter More About the FATfl, at http://
www.oecd.org/fatf/AboutFATF-en.htm (last modified May 14, 2004) (discussing
history and purpose of intergovernmental FATF regulating body).
2. See generally FATF, Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATE 40 Rec-
ommendations and the FATF 8 Special Recommendations (Feb. 27, 2004) [hereinafter
2004 Methodology], available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/Meth-2004_en.PDF
(645)
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confiscation in AML/CFT areas. Specifically, I will focus on FATF Recom-
mendation Three and then on FATF Special Recommendation III and the
relevant criteria in each Recommendation. 3 First, however, I would like to
give an overview of the history of the IMF's involvement in this area.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE IMF INVOLVEMENT IN THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERING AND TERRORIST FINANCING
Historically, there have been many successful initiatives by the world
community after global efforts to combat AML/CFT began in the early
1990s with the FATF. Money laundering is now criminalized in almost all
countries, and banks and financial institutions are much better protected
today against penetration by criminal organizations than they were ten
years ago. Additionally, a network of financial intelligence units (FIUs) is
now in place to provide a rapid response to criminal money transfers, and
confiscation of large sums of money is now routine in some countries.
National and global efforts, however, had plateaued because of the
difficulty of ensuring universal and consistent application of international
standards and also because of a lack of resources to address the problem
in a number of countries. Only twenty-eight countries were members of
the FATF4 and the FATF realized that if it was to broaden its sphere of
influence, it must ask the international institutions of the IMF and the
World Bank to join the FATF in the fight against money laundering and
the financing of terrorism.
Consequently, three years ago, the international community asked
the IMF and World Bank to contribute to anti-money laundering efforts,
and, in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, to help counter the financ-
ing of terrorism. This contribution takes the form of an assessment pro-
gram and technical assistance services across the wide membership of the
184 IMF member countries. The assessment program, using a methodol-
ogy common to the IMF, the World Bank and the FATF, allows us to iden-
tify deficiencies in country frameworks, whether in the legal framework on
criminalization, confiscation, mutual legal assistance, extradition or finan-
cial sector robustness.
Under the 2003 Revised FATF Forty, assessments will also extend to
cover aspects of designated non-financial businesses and professions
(addressing 2004 Methodology's background, use in assessment and evaluations,
interpretation and compliance).
3. See generally FATF, Interpretative Note to Special Recommendation III: Freezing and
Confiscating Terrorist Assets (Oct. 3, 2003) [hereinafter Interpretative Note], available at
http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/INSR3-en.pdf (interpreting proper freezing and
confiscating compliance procedures in relation to terrorist activities).
4. See FATF, More About the FATF, supra note 1 (providing history of FATF and
documenting expansion of membership over time); see also FATF, Members and Ob-
servers, at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/Membersen.htm#Members (last modified
Jan. 31, 2005) (providing complete list of current FATF members as well as groups
with observer status).
[Vol. 50: p. 645
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(DNFBPs) such as lawyers, accountants and precious metal dealers. As-
sessments cover both the legal framework and the implementation of the
country's AML/CFT framework. The experience of the pilot program
highlighted that among the main deficiencies were: inadequate measures
to confiscate terrorist assets, a lack of requirements to obtain information
on customer identity, a lack of international cooperation and inadequate
systems to report suspicious transactions linked to terrorism. Through the
provision of an ambitious program of technical assistance, the IMF offers
help in addressing those deficiencies-some sixty-three countries have
been directly assisted by the IMF in the last year, with 130 countries bene-
fiting from thirty-two regional programs. 5 In March 2004, this work was
made a permanent part of the work of the IMF.
Although progress has been made, let us be clear on one point: crime
still pays. The history of the fight against money laundering and the fi-
nancing of terrorism is that the bad guys are quick to engage in a kind of
criminal arbitrage. Money launderers will exploit any weakness in legisla-
tive and institutional frameworks, both domestic and international. They
will take advantage of any failure of international cooperation, particularly
in informal, unregulated and unsupervised sectors. They will find loop-
holes wherever they exist.6 The international community, therefore,
would like to ensure that all countries have the appropriate systems in
place to deter money laundering and combat terrorist financing. This re-
quires that proceeds of criminal offenses are removed from the financial
system and removed from the control of criminals.
In this process, many considerations must be balanced against each
other between government powers and individual freedoms. In the area
of AML/CFT, there has been a significant move towards government pow-
ers. The IMF Legal Department has been asked to advise a number of
countries on these issues.
II. THE RATIONALE OF AML/CFT REQUIREMENTS REGARDING
CONFISCATION UNDER FATF RECOMMENDATION THREE
The underlying rationale of 2003 FATF Recommendation Three
(provisional measures and confiscation) and FATF Special Recommenda-
tion III (freezing and confiscating terrorist assets) is that countries must
have the ability to confiscate proceeds and instrumentalities of money
laundering, terrorist financing or other predicate offenses in order to re-
move them from the financial system, and thereby weaken the position of
criminals globally. In the previous FATF Forty from 1996, only money
laundering crimes were required to be covered. The new 2003 standard
5. See IMF, The JM and the Fight Against Money Laundering and the Financing of
Terrorism (Sept. 2004), at http://www.imf.org/ external/np/exr/facts/aml.htm
(explaining IMF's role in fighting money laundering and initiatives taken to com-
bat it).
6. Augustine Carstens, Deputy Managing Director of IMF, Address at the IMF
Legal Department's Semi-Annual Central Banking Seminar (June 2004).
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under FATF Recommendation Three is much broader-reaching and cov-
ers, at a minimum, money laundering and terrorist financing offenses, as
well as the predicate crimes listed in the designated categories of offenses
located in the glossary of the 2004 Methodology. This minimum list was
agreed to by the delegations of the FATF after much debate. This means
that all countries must be able to seize, restrain and confiscate proceeds
from offenses such as drug offences, human trafficking, fraud and corrup-
tion. 7 Essentially, this means that authorities should have powers to iden-
tify property, seize and freeze property and confiscate property in an
effective manner.
In the next round of assessments of countries to be undertaken by the
IMF, World Bank, FATF and the FATF Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs),
such as MoneyVal and the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
(CFATF), assessors will have to examine the extent to which countries are
seizing, confiscating or otherwise restraining all property that is the pro-
ceeds of crime and not just some of such property, and whether they are
doing so effectively. For example, in some jurisdictions, proceeds of ter-
rorist financing and instrumentalities of money laundering may be subject
to seizure, restraint or confiscation by law, but in practice no such action is
taken by the authorities for various reasons, such as lack of understanding
of the standard, lack of understanding of the concept of instrumentalities
or legal impediments to such seizures.
Assessors must also look at mutual legal assistance with respect to con-
fiscation to ensure that countries can assist other countries in restraining
and confiscating international proceeds of crime. This is the next phase
of implementation to be worked on by countries in order to fully comply
with the revised FATF Recommendations. In summary, provisional mea-
sures and confiscation must cover laundered funds (including any com-
missions made by the money launderers) or proceeds of predicate
offenses or their equivalent value-instrumentalities used or intended for
use in money laundering, financing terrorism or predicate offenses and
property of corresponding value (i.e., money judgments and substitute as-
sets) as per criterion 3.1 of the 2004 Methodology.
Seizure and confiscation of property in the hands of third parties is
also a current issue, and one that, if not dealt with adequately, can seri-
ously undermine the effectiveness of a confiscation regime. Confiscation
procedures usually recognize that confiscation of property will require the
freezing or confiscation of property from third parties in order to prevent
any dealing, transfer or disposal of property subject to confiscation.8 In
assessing the adequacy and effectiveness of a particular regime, assessors
will need to review when this can occur and in what circumstances (i.e.,
7. See 2004 Methodology, supra note 2, at 72 (defining "designated categories of
offences").
8. See id. 3.2, at 10 (explaining what is required under Recommendation III
through "Essential criteria" clarification 3.2 that includes laws and other provisions
to preserve property subject to confiscation).
648 [Vol. 50: p. 645
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how are spouses, nominees or corporate owners treated). In particular,
assessors will need to review the burdens and presumptions that are part
of the legal system in this area. In some jurisdictions, there is a reverse
onus of proof so that the defendant must prove that he or she came into
possession of the proceeds in question by legal means. In other jurisdic-
tions, the state may have to prove at a civil standard only that the proceeds
were proceeds of crime obtained by a connected party and therefore
should be subject to seizure or freezing provisions.
Another area of review and potential difficulty is gifts. Assessors must
review how gifts are treated in the relevant legislation. What is considered
to be a bona fide transaction in each particular country? Bona fide third
parties should be able to defeat confiscation and forfeiture of their prop-
erty. Assessors must review this principle in the area of voiding contracts
as well as in the area of confiscation. Is an innocent-owner defense to
confiscation and forfeiture available?9
Other areas to be reviewed in countries in order to assess the effec-
tiveness of their particular regimes include the number and value of con-
fiscations, restraints and seizures in that particular jurisdiction and reasons
for lack of any of the above. For example, assessors will look to evidentiary
problems, restrictive judicial interpretations or judicial discretion in non-
mandatory confiscation jurisdictions, and compare this with available data
on the underlying proceeds generating offenses. In order to further assess
the effectiveness of the particular regime, assessors will need to review the
number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions. 10 It is also impor-
tant to assess the resources and capacity as well as the background and
training of the relevant authorities. 1 Moreover, assessors will look for spe-
cialized units of prosecutors who can effectively prosecute cases and forfeit
property. These units tend to have better success than a generalized ap-
proach to prosecution, given the complex nature of cases in this area.
Also relevant is the question of the different types of confiscation that
are available in a particular jurisdiction. What is the standard of proof
required in confiscation matters? Are judges imposing a higher standard
than is required by law? Assessors will also look to procedural law. Re-
strictive procedural guarantees for defendants in either the provisional
measures regime or the confiscation regime can circumvent the intent of
confiscation law. For example, in one jurisdiction, the Criminal Proce-
dure Code allowed freezing for only a short time before the proceeds had
9. See id. 1 3.5, at 10 (positing idea that under Criterion 3.5 law should pro-
vide protection for rights of bona fide third parties).
10. See id. 32.2, at 45 (explaining that authorities should maintain statistics
on matters relating to combating money laundering and terrorist financing as sug-
gested in Criterion 32.2 of 2004 Methodology, including transaction reports, statis-
tics on prosecutions and data on legal assistance).
11. See id. 27.5, at 40 (elaborating further techniques that should be used as
instructed by elements in Criterion 27.5 of 2004 Methodology).
20051
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to be returned to the defendant. 12 This effectively nullified the seizure
and confiscation provisions laid out by the jurisdiction in the substantive
law.
These are the types of issues that assessors from the IMF, World Bank,
FATF and the FSRBs must look at in assessing how effective countries
around the world are at combating the financing of international crime.
The IMF Legal Department also looks at such issues when assisting coun-
tries in this area when it gives technical assistance. These are the same
issues that all countries must look at when drafting their legal frameworks
in order to create robust and effective confiscation regimes that can
decouple proceeds of crime from the crimes themselves.
III. UNIQUE CONSIDERATIONS FOR SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION III:
FREEZING AND CONFISCATING TERRORIST ASSETS
Requirements to comply with FATF Special Recommendation III ("SR
III") have been amplified under the 2004 Methodology. SR III require-
ments should now also be read in conjunction with the Interpretive Note
to SR III and the relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions
(UNSCRs) 1267 and its successor resolution, 1373, and any prospective
resolutions relating to the freezing and, if appropriate, seizure of terrorist
assets. SR III consists of two obligations.
The first obligation "requires jurisdictions to implement measures
that will freeze or, if appropriate, seize terrorist-related funds or other as-
sets without delay in accordance with relevant United Nations resolu-
tions."13 The second obligation of SR III is "to have measures in place that
permit a jurisdiction to seize or confiscate terrorist funds or other assets
on the basis of an order or mechanism issued by a competent authority or
a court.' 4 Essentially, in order to comply with SR III, a jurisdiction must
have effective laws and procedures (i.e., authority to designate persons
and entities) to freeze terrorist funds or other assets of persons designated
under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 and subsequent related UNSCRs. For
more details, see specifically the requirements under SR III.1 and SR 111.2
of the 2004 Methodology, which include the requirement that a country
"have effective laws and procedures to freeze terrorist funds or other assets
of persons designated" in the context of UNSCR 1373.15 According to SR
111, "[s]uch freezing should take place without delay and without prior
notice to the designated persons involved."' 6 In practical terms, countries
must verify that the action taken is "without delay" by confirming the pro-
12. The proceeds had to be turned over to the defendant before trial.
13. See Interpretative Note, supra note 3, 1-2, at 1 (listing obligations and
objectives of Special Recommendation III).
14. See id. (same).
15. See 2004 Methodology, supra note 2, 111.1, at 61 (requiring countries to
enact appropriate freezing and seizure laws to comply with regulations).
16. Id. 111.2.
[Vol. 50: p. 645
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cedures that it has in place to freeze funds in order to comply with UNSCR
1267 and successor resolutions when it receives an updated UN list of
targeted terrorists. More interestingly, SR III also requires that countries
have laws and procedures to examine and give effect to freezing requests
received from other jurisdictions under UNSCR 1373. In practical terms
this means that countries must be able to designate terrorists quickly. Des-
ignation is a necessary initial step in order to identify terrorist-related as-
sets to be frozen. 17
Designating terrorists under UNSCR 1373 is a completely different
process than designating them under UNSCR 1267.18 Under 1267, the
UN Security Council designates persons or entities as terrorists or terrorist
organizations. These designations are taken from member nations, who
using the UN process, send their requested designations to the UN Secur-
ity Council. If no other country objects, the name is then added to the list
on a lapse-of-time basis. The lists are then circulated to countries and dis-
seminated within countries using whatever national system has been set
up.
The system under UNSCR 1373 and successor resolutions is differ-
ent.19 There is no central repository for all lists. There is no common list.
Rather, each country may have its own list which it can circulate on a bilat-
eral or multilateral basis. Consequently, each country must have a desig-
nation person or committee who can review the names on a circulated list
from another country and decide if those persons or entities should be
designated in their particular country as terrorists. For example, in the
United States, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has the re-
sponsibility for handling such requests. It is possible that a particular
country may not agree with the designation, but that country must have a
clear methodology or approach which is consistently used to come to that
conclusion. Whatever decision is taken, this authority will also need to
keep copies of all its decisions as well as a record of all the different coun-
try terrorist lists it has received and how it has disseminated them. If the
country decides that it agrees with the designation, then it must freeze the
accounts of any such persons or entities, and "such freezing should take
place without delay and without prior notice to the designated persons
17. See Interpretative Note, supra note 3, 3, at 1, 6, at 2 (addressing issues of
"designated persons" and freezing without delay to efficiently combat terrorist fi-
nancing); see also 2004 Methodology, supra note 2, 111.8, at 62 (stating that in addi-
tion to freezing procedures "countries should have effective and publicly-known
procedures for unfreezing").
18. See S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 53d Sess., 4051st mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/
RES/1267 (1999) (requiring all states to comply with freezing of funds of those
designated by UN Security Council committee).
19. See S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
1373 (2001) (requiring countries to undertake terrorism-prevention processes).
20051
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involved."20 The "no prior notice" requirement is similar to the "no tip-
ping off" provisions under the anti-money laundering regime.
Countries must have readily identifiable contact authorities so that
other countries know who to contact when looking to advise that country
on a new terrorist designation. How will this be effected: on a government
website, advertised to other countries, clearly accessible to a wide group of
people? It is critical that countries set up a designation authority that has
the mandate and the ability to convene and consider requests rapidly. For
example, countries will not be in compliance with SR III if the designation
body must refer the matter to a high level committee that only meets once
a quarter.
Designation is a necessary initial step in the freezing mechanism in
order to identify terrorist-related assets to be frozen. Once a designation
is made, notification must be given to various parties, depending upon the
nature of the located terrorist target. Each country must have procedures
in place in order to notify any or all of the following:
" the UN Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (Crite-
rion 111.1) if an Al-Qaida person or entity is designated;
" other countries under UNSCR 1373 (Criterion 111.2) where
accounts for a designated terrorist from that other country's
list are located by the local financial institution or authority;
* the financial sector within the country pursuant to the "imme-
diate" notification requirement in Criterion 111.5; and
* the general public, given the expansive scope of funds or
other assets as laid out in Criterion 111.5 which may need to be
frozen.
Further, "clear guidance" must be issued by a country to its financial insti-
tutions and the general public regarding freezing obligations.
21
Should a financial institution find money or assets in an account in
the name of a designated terrorist in its institution, the financial institu-
tion must be able to report to an identifiable central authority via an iden-
tifiable mechanism immediately. Does the country have a toll-free
number to call, a website, a manned e-mail address? How will that country
be available to assist its citizens with questions on this matter? One of the
difficulties posed by SR III is the wide definition of funds or other assets
which are defined as:
[F]inancial assets, property of every kind, whether tangible or in-
tangible, movable or immovable, however acquired, and legal
documents or instruments in any form, including electronic or
20. See 2004 Methodology, supra note 2, 111.2, at 61 (elaborating on freezing
procedures).
21. See id. 111.6, at 62 (stating that, to be compliant with Criterion 111.6,
countries should provide guidance in relation to freezing mechanisms to anyone
who may be holding targeted funds or assets).
[Vol. 50: p. 645
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digital, evidencing title to, or interest in, such funds or other as-
sets, including, but not limited to, bank credits, travellers che-
ques, bank cheques, money orders, shares, securities, bonds,
drafts, or letters of credit, and any interest, dividends or other
income on or value accruing from or generated by such funds or
other assets.
2 2
This effectively means that many companies may be caught by this recom-
mendation, and so entities that have formerly not been exposed to the
FATF Forty and the Nine Special Recommendations may now need to be
aware of such requirements. This will be a particular challenge for many
countries going forward, as most companies do not have a regulatory au-
thority on which to rely for advice and assistance. How will countries
reach such companies with the relevant information and assistance?
Under SR III, a country must also have the legal and operational au-
thority as well as the capacity to monitor compliance by all affected enti-
ties. 23 Again, how are countries going to monitor compliance by a
number of entities previously unaffected by either anti-money laundering
or combating the financing of terrorist regimes? Finally, countries are re-
quired to have a full range of sanctions available for noncompliance-
criminal, civil or administrative. 24 The United States, through the OFAC,
is leading the way in this area. The United States authorities will be offer-
ing technical assistance to countries in implementing SR III by setting up
and upgrading their own authorities. Likewise, the IMF will also offer
such technical assistance, and efforts are underway to ensure that efforts
will be coordinated in this area.
IV. SOME FINAL THOUGHTS
Compliance with SR III will be a challenge for many countries and
will be the subject of many technical assistance requests in the upcoming
years. There is no clear assessment of the amount of funds which may
likely be frozen from terrorist financing. There are, however, some figures
available on the money laundering side of things. To put the money laun-
dering issue into perspective, the cost and risk of money laundering and
organized crime were assessed in the United Kingdom in the full regula-
tory impact assessment for the Money Laundering Regulations 2003.25
The report stated:
22. Interpretative Note, supra note 3, 1 7d, at 3.
23. See 2004 Methodology, supra note 2, 111.13, at 63 (explaining that coun-
tries should have appropriate monitoring and sanctioning capabilities).
24. See id. (stating that countries should have sanctions available); Interpretive
Note, supra note 3, 8h, at 6 (stating that "[f] ailure to comply ... should be subject
to civil, administrative or criminal sanctions").
25. See generally Anti-Money Laundering Branch, Her Majesty's Treasury, Full
Regulatory Impact Assessment Money Laundering Regulations 2003 (Nov. 26, 2003), at
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/media/4B7/B5/fullriamlrO3-80.pdf (reporting
on implementation, regulation and risk assessment of money laundering issues).
2005] 653
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The risk posed by money laundering is twofold: its facilitation of
underlying criminal activities, and the threat to economic and
financial activity when high flows of laundered money distort
normal market incentives. Most crimes are committed for finan-
cial gain, and the volume of criminal assets laundered through
the UK is undeniably large. Recent estimates indicate that the
value of illegal drugs transactions in the UK could be up to £8.5
billion per annum, with direct losses from fraud totaling some
£10.3 billion per annum.... Moreover, comparatively small flows
of money can facilitate serious offences: efforts to disrupt the
funding arrangements of terrorist organisations have led govern-
ments around the world to strengthen their anti-money launder-
ing regimes.2 6
Clearly this is a challenging area for financial institutions as well as the
international community. The numbers listed above are extremely high
and show the degree to which proceeds of crime are still flowing through
the international financial systems despite all that has been done so far to
combat this problem. Training is the key, both in terms of general anti-
money laundering measures as well as specific training on spotting suspi-
cious transactions and distinguishing them from those that are legitimate.
While a solid legal framework is critical, implementation on a day-to-
day basis is the key. This is particularly the case regarding the role of the
FIU. The more knowledge the national FIU gains about financial transac-
tions, both legitimate and suspicious ones, the more quickly it will be able
to assist financial institutions in making speedy decisions about specific
cases reported to the FIU by the financial institutions. From there, cases
can be developed, assets can be frozen, seized or otherwise restrained;
and, over time, prosecutions can be taken against money launderers and
terrorist financiers resulting in the eventual confiscation of the proceeds
of crime from the criminals. Furthermore, typologies of money launder-
ing schemes can be circulated nationally so as to alert other financial insti-
tutions and DNFBPs to "red flags" to watch out for when embarking on
financial transactions with or for clients.
The work at the IMF will continue in the areas of assessment and
providing technical assistance to IMF membership with the goal that all
participants in the international financial system will take up the fight
against money laundering and terrorist financing. Hopefully, this work
will result in the amount of seizures, restraints and eventual confiscations
increasing dramatically, so that criminals will no longer feel that crime
pays.
26. Id. 8, at 2-3.
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